Configuration — tools and custom providers

tools.* config keys and custom provider / base-URL setup. For agents, channels, and other top-level config keys, see Configuration reference.

Tools

Tool profiles

tools.profile sets a base allowlist before tools.allow/tools.deny:

Local onboarding defaults new local configs to tools.profile: "coding" when unset (existing explicit profiles are preserved).

Profile	Includes
`minimal`	`session_status` only
`coding`	`group:fs`, `group:runtime`, `group:web`, `group:sessions`, `group:memory`, `cron`, `get_goal`, `create_goal`, `update_goal`, `progress_card`, `ask_user`, `skill_workshop`, `image`, `image_generate`, `music_generate`, `video_generate`
`messaging`	`group:messaging`, `sessions`, `sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_search`, `conversations_list`, `conversations_send`, `conversations_turn`, `sessions_send`, `sessions_spawn`, `sessions_yield`, `subagents`, `session_status`, `ask_user`
`full`	No restriction (same as unset)

coding and messaging also implicitly allow bundle-mcp (configured MCP servers).

Tool groups

Group	Tools
`group:runtime`	`exec`, `process`, `code_execution` (`bash` is accepted as an alias for `exec`)
`group:fs`	`read`, `write`, `edit`, `apply_patch`
`group:sessions`	`sessions`, `sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_search`, `conversations_list`, `conversations_send`, `conversations_turn`, `sessions_send`, `sessions_spawn`, `sessions_yield`, `subagents`, `session_status`, `suggest_task`, `dismiss_task`
`group:memory`	`memory_search`, `memory_get`
`group:web`	`web_search`, `x_search`, `web_fetch`
`group:ui`	`browser`, `screen`, `dashboard`, `terminal`, `portal`, `canvas`, `show_widget`
`group:automation`	`heartbeat_respond`, `cron`, `gateway`
`group:messaging`	`message`
`group:nodes`	`nodes`, `computer`
`group:agents`	`agents_list`, `get_goal`, `create_goal`, `update_goal`, `progress_card`, `ask_user`, `skill_workshop`
`group:media`	`image`, `image_generate`, `music_generate`, `video_generate`, `tts`
`group:openclaw`	All built-in tools above except `read`/`write`/`edit`/`apply_patch`/`exec`/`process`/`canvas` (excludes plugin tools)
`group:plugins`	Tools owned by loaded plugins, including configured MCP servers exposed through `bundle-mcp`

suggest_task lets a coding agent propose confirmed follow-up work without starting it. The suggestion’s project directory must be a git checkout; invalid suggestions, including a non-git directory or blank prompt, are rejected when the tool records them. The Control UI shows the title and summary as an actionable chip; a Gateway-backed TUI shows an equivalent interactive prompt. Accepting a suggestion can start it in a fresh managed worktree (the default), start it locally in a new session in the suggested checkout, send it to a cloud worker profile when one is configured, or deliver it into the source session. OpenClaw sends the full prompt to the selected destination while the current turn continues. dismiss_task withdraws a still-pending suggestion by the ephemeral task_id returned from suggest_task. The tools are offered only when the initiating operator surface can receive and action Gateway task-suggestion events. Channel sessions and local/embedded TUI sessions do not receive them; channel transports need a portable typed task action before they can safely expose this flow. Suggestions are process-local and disappear when the Gateway restarts. Both tools remain in the coding profile and group:sessions, so normal tools.allow and tools.deny policy configures them automatically when the surface supports them.

MCP and plugin tools inside sandbox tool policy

Configured MCP servers are exposed as plugin-owned tools under the bundle-mcp plugin id. Normal tool profiles can allow them, but tools.sandbox.tools is an additional gate for sandboxed sessions. If sandbox mode is "all" or "non-main", include one of these entries in the sandbox tool allowlist when MCP/plugin tools should be visible:

bundle-mcp for OpenClaw-managed MCP servers from mcp.servers
the plugin id for a specific native plugin
group:plugins for all loaded plugin-owned tools
exact MCP server tool names or server globs such as outlook__send_mail or outlook__* when you only want one server

Server globs use the provider-safe MCP server prefix, not necessarily the raw mcp.servers key. Non-[A-Za-z0-9_-] characters become -, names that do not start with a letter get an mcp- prefix, and long or duplicate prefixes may be truncated or suffixed; for example, mcp.servers["Outlook Graph"] uses a glob like outlook-graph__*. Per-run toolsAllow caps also accept globs such as outlook* or out*graph* for configured MCP servers. These globs can trigger catalog discovery across all enabled static MCP servers, just like outlook__*; they do not limit which servers connect. Discovery is conservative and can run even when no tool ultimately matches. Final tool allow/deny and sandbox policies still apply, disabled servers remain excluded unless explicitly enabled by a session override, and requester-scoped servers still require their verified requester context.

{
  agents: { defaults: { sandbox: { mode: "all" } } },
  mcp: {
    servers: {
      outlook: { command: "node", args: ["./outlook-mcp.js"] },
    },
  },
  tools: {
    sandbox: {
      tools: {
        alsoAllow: ["web_search", "web_fetch", "memory_search", "memory_get", "bundle-mcp"],
      },
    },
  },
}

Without that sandbox-layer entry, the MCP server can still load successfully while its tools are filtered before the provider request. Use openclaw doctor to catch this shape for OpenClaw-managed servers in mcp.servers. MCP servers loaded from bundled plugin manifests or Claude .mcp.json use the same sandbox gate, but this diagnostic does not enumerate those sources yet; use the same allowlist entries if their tools disappear in sandboxed turns.

`tools.codeMode`

tools.codeMode gates the generic OpenClaw code-mode surface. When engaged for a run with tools, normal OpenClaw tools move behind the in-sandbox tools.* catalog bridge, and MCP tools are available through the generated MCP namespace. The model normally sees exec and wait; tools such as computer whose structured results cannot cross the JSON-only bridge stay direct. enabled defaults to false, including when the object sets other Code Mode options. To engage code mode only for models whose catalog entry flags compat.codeMode: "preferred", enable "auto" explicitly. See Code Mode - automatic per-model activation.

{
  tools: {
    codeMode: {
      enabled: "auto",
    },
  },
}

The shorthand is also accepted:

{
  tools: { codeMode: "auto" },
}

enabled: true forces code mode on for every tool-capable run, regardless of model. MCP declarations are exposed through the read-only virtual API file surface in code mode. Guest code can call API.list("mcp") and API.read("mcp/<server>.d.ts") to inspect TypeScript-style signatures before calling MCP.<server>.<tool>(). See Code Mode for the runtime contract, limits, and debugging steps.

`tools.allow` / `tools.deny`

Global tool allow/deny policy (deny wins). Case-insensitive, supports * wildcards. Applied even when Docker sandbox is off.

{
  tools: { deny: ["browser", "canvas"] },
}

write and apply_patch are separate tool ids. allow: ["write"] also enables apply_patch for compatible models, but deny: ["write"] does not deny apply_patch. To block all file mutation, deny group:fs or list each mutating tool explicitly:

{
  tools: { deny: ["write", "edit", "apply_patch"] },
}

allow and alsoAllow cannot both be set in the same scope (tools, tools.byProvider.<id>, agents.entries.*.tools) — config validation rejects it. Merge alsoAllow entries into allow, or drop allow and use profile + alsoAllow instead.

The image inspection tool is view_image. If an older config still names image in an allow, alsoAllow, or deny list, run openclaw doctor --fix to rewrite supported global, per-agent, provider, sandbox, sender, channel, and Gateway policy surfaces. Doctor preserves patterns such as image* that may still match other tools and adds view_image when the pattern no longer covers inspection. Patterns that already cover both names, such as * or *image*, remain unchanged.

`tools.byProvider`

Further restrict tools for specific providers or models. Order: base profile → provider profile → allow/deny.

{
  tools: {
    profile: "coding",
    byProvider: {
      anthropic: { profile: "minimal" },
      "openai/gpt-5.4": { allow: ["group:fs", "sessions_list"] },
    },
  },
}

`tools.toolsBySender`

Restricts tools for the current turn’s originating requester. This is defense-in-depth on top of channel access control; sender values must come from the channel adapter, not message text. It does not authenticate other content in the model prompt; see Requester-scoped controls and prompt context.

{
  tools: {
    toolsBySender: {
      "channel:discord:1234567890123": { alsoAllow: ["group:fs"] },
      "id:guest-user-id": { deny: ["group:runtime", "group:fs"] },
      "*": { deny: ["exec", "process", "write", "edit", "apply_patch"] },
    },
  },
}

Keys use explicit prefixes: channel:<channelId>:<senderId>, id:<senderId>, e164:<phone>, username:<handle>, name:<displayName>, or "*". Channel ids are canonical OpenClaw ids; aliases such as teams normalize to msteams. Legacy unprefixed keys are accepted as id: only. Matching order is channel+id, id, e164, username, name, then wildcard. Per-agent agents.entries.*.tools.toolsBySender overrides the global sender match when it matches, even with an empty {} policy.

`tools.elevated`

Controls elevated exec access outside the sandbox:

{
  tools: {
    elevated: {
      enabled: true,
      allowFrom: {
        whatsapp: ["+15555550123"],
        discord: ["1234567890123", "987654321098765432"],
      },
    },
  },
}

Per-agent override (agents.entries.*.tools.elevated) can only further restrict.
/elevated on|off|ask|full stores state per session; inline directives apply to single message.
Elevated exec bypasses sandboxing and uses the configured escape path (gateway by default, or node when the exec target is node).

`tools.github`

GitHub CLI identity is native by default. When tools.github is omitted, local agent tools, the Codex harness, and Agent Settings follow normal gh resolution: GH_TOKEN or GITHUB_TOKEN from the Gateway process takes precedence, followed by the runtime user’s gh keyring/config. The Git author comes from the selected agent’s workspace. Use Settings → Profile → GitHub connections to see My GitHub and System GitHub together. Administrators explicitly choose For the system to configure this shared execution identity; the general connection flow defaults to For me for identified users. Per-agent overrides remain an advanced administrative setting under Agents → Tools. A personal connection is separate from tools.github: it supports explicitly selected Gateway-brokered publication and does not change agent shell credentials, shared defaults, or verified sign-in identity. See GitHub connections. OpenClaw displays a one-time user code with a Copy code button beside it; clicking the code selects it in full for manual copying. Open the fixed https://github.com/login/device link, paste the code, and approve repo, workflow, read:org, and gist. The latter two are part of GitHub CLI’s minimum classic-token contract. The Gateway owns the device code, token exchange, account verification, private managed gh profile, and rotating refresh token. Setup and refresh do not return credentials in browser responses or place them in config, logs, command arguments, transcripts, or the model runtime environment. OpenClaw-owned local exec receives an access token only through its private process-launch environment, as described below. OAuth access tokens expire after about eight hours. The Gateway refreshes them before expiry, verifies the durable GitHub account ID, and atomically replaces the credential inside the same private profile. New local exec launches use the refreshed credential; an already-running local exec keeps its launch token until it exits. Restart a long-running shell after its access token expires. An expired or rejected refresh token is shown as Reconnect required. Refresh never blocks Gateway startup. Use a PAT instead preserves fine-grained personal access token setup as an explicit alternative. The browser places the pasted token in the secret store as a one-use handoff. The Gateway hard-deletes that handoff before validating the supplied credential with GitHub’s /user endpoint. Both setup paths write an account-owned private gh profile without changing the host’s global GitHub CLI login or OS keyring, default Git authorship to the account’s canonical GitHub noreply identity, and store only secret-free OpenClaw config:

{
  tools: {
    github: {
      profileId: "ghp_0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
      kind: "oauth",
      gitAuthor: { name: "Automation User", email: "automation@example.com" },
    },
  },
  agents: {
    entries: {
      reviewer: {
        tools: {
          github: {
            profileId: "ghp_fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210",
            gitAuthor: { name: "Review Agent" },
          },
        },
      },
    },
  },
}

Omitting agents.entries.<id>.tools.github inherits the system identity. An agent object is a complete managed override. Settings shows the effective identity and the selected configuration scope separately, so editing System never masquerades as an agent override. If a configured managed profile is missing, tokenless, or corrupt, GitHub status reports configured_unavailable rather than reporting the native account. Gateway-brokered publication verifies the selected profile’s own credential and pins it for each child operation; a missing profile cannot redirect publication to native authentication. Ordinary agent shell execution continues to use the shared or per-agent selection, with the execution boundaries described below. Managed identity selects the gh CLI/API account and optional Git author/committer metadata. OpenClaw prepares a non-secret overlay containing the private GH_CONFIG_DIR, ambient token scrubs, and configured author fields. For local execution, it does not install a credential helper, rewrite SSH remotes, add HTTP authorization headers, or otherwise override an existing repository’s Git network credentials. Commands still use the existing gh on PATH, including any operator-managed protection or caching wrapper. For OpenClaw-owned exec with host=gateway, including Pi exec and Codex gateway_exec, the local launch owner reads and validates the selected profile immediately before each process launch. It places that access token in GH_TOKEN only in the private child environment and clears GITHUB_TOKEN; approval payloads and shared run environments remain non-secret. A missing, tokenless, or insecure profile refuses the local execution before the command starts instead of permitting native-keyring fallback. This also applies to commands that might invoke gh indirectly. Reconnect or change the GitHub Identity selection before retrying. A launched command retains its selected credential even if the profile later disappears; the next exec launch reads the profile again. Codex-native shell is a separate boundary. Native exec_command and shell execution still receive the non-secret profile overlay, not the private launch-time credential binding. GH_CONFIG_DIR does not isolate the OS keyring: if the selected profile disappears or loses its token, GitHub CLI can fall back to native keyring credentials. Use gateway_exec when the launch-bound managed identity guarantee is required. GitHub status and Gateway-owned publication guarantees do not extend to native shell execution. Choosing a different identity or inheritance target selects another profile for new runs. An admitted run keeps its prior profile selection, and already-launched local exec processes keep their launch token until they exit. Retired profile files are cleaned on the next Gateway restart, so changing this setting is not immediate credential revocation. Managed profiles provide execution and coordination identity; they are not an OS-user security sandbox. A process with unrestricted host execution under the same OS account can access account-owned files, including managed gh profiles. Use an OpenClaw sandbox, a dedicated host, or a dedicated OS user when adversarial isolation is required. OpenClaw worker-turn cloud workers receive the effective shared identity per turn through their private launch envelope. The worker writes the access token to a private per-turn profile in its throwaway state directory, with earlier profiles removed before the next binding; the same OS-user limit described above applies on the worker host. The sealed worker launcher gives each exec child the same launch-time credential binding as local exec. GitHub CLI must be installed on the worker host; the bundle includes the launcher, not gh. The checkout uses the session-owned branch and an HTTPS origin for GitHub repositories; HTTPS Git authentication uses gh auth git-credential, with inherited credential helpers cleared. Commits and pushes happen directly on the worker. Reconciliation returns file contents to the Gateway worktree, not commit history. At every turn start, the worker fast-forwards its checkout to the session branch on origin when the local branch is behind, bringing in history pushed by an earlier worker; a diverged local branch is left untouched. Paired devices’ own GitHub CLI logins are not used for this binding. OpenClaw sandboxes, ordinary node-host exec, and Codex remote-exec placements still do not receive the Gateway’s managed GitHub credentials. The github_publish tool remains available for remote-exec sessions: it records a bounded publication request without credentials or repository authority. After the exact workspace result is reconciled and accepted, the Gateway commits remaining changes as the verified effective GitHub user, pushes the authoritative session branch through a one-shot HTTPS credential helper, and creates or reuses a draft pull request. Local session-owned worktrees can use the same Publish PR action in the Control UI. The Gateway derives the managed worktree, repository, branch, base, and head from current session ownership. It never accepts those authority facts from the browser or model. Publication retries use a durable request ID, an exact commit marker, remote branch observation, and pull-request lookup by head branch so a Gateway restart or lost response does not create duplicate commits, pushes, or pull requests. Verification proves which account answered the GitHub API request. Status reports the credential kind, access expiry, refresh availability, OAuth scopes, and Git author while distinguishing missing credentials, unverified transport failures, and GitHub rate limiting without returning gh diagnostics. Repository-specific grants remain unknown until an exact repository operation succeeds; /user does not prove write access. Removing an agent override or choosing native credentials deletes the associated local refresh record after the config change. Already-running local processes may retain the old profile and its current access token until they exit, restart, or the token expires, while new runs use the updated identity immediately. This local change does not revoke the authorization at GitHub; revoke it separately from the OAuth application’s GitHub settings when required. Control UI issue and pull request hover previews use the selected agent’s effective managed GitHub identity, including an inherited system identity. An unavailable managed identity produces an actionable error rather than switching to another credential. Without a managed selection, previews retain the optional gateway.controlUi.github.token service credential, shared GH_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN environment fallback, and anonymous public access. Previews remain public-only, and their caches are scoped to the credential used. Project discovery continues to use the separate service credential. When this SecretRef is explicit, OpenClaw excludes its exact environment or store name from agent execution. A custom name does not clear unrelated GH_TOKEN or GITHUB_TOKEN values used by native identity; a ref named GH_TOKEN or GITHUB_TOKEN excludes that exact variable.

`tools.exec`

{
  tools: {
    exec: {
      backgroundMs: 10000,
      timeoutSeconds: 1800,
      cleanupMs: 1800000,
      approvalRunningNoticeMs: 10000,
      notifyOnExit: true,
      notifyOnExitEmptySuccess: false,
      commandHighlighting: false,
      applyPatch: {
        enabled: true,
        allowModels: ["gpt-5.6-sol"],
      },
    },
  },
}

Values shown are defaults except applyPatch.allowModels (empty/unset by default, meaning any compatible model may use apply_patch). approvalRunningNoticeMs emits a running notice when approval-backed exec runs long; 0 disables it. tools.exec.grantExpiryDays (unset by default) sets the default lifetime, in days (1–3650), for standing grants minted by Always allow on automation approvals. Unset keeps grants valid until revoked or the owning automation changes. Terms freeze at mint, so changing the value affects only future grants; see Standing grants for automations.

`tools.loopDetection`

Tool-loop safety checks are disabled by default. Set enabled: true to activate detection. Settings can be defined globally in tools.loopDetection and overridden per-agent at agents.entries.*.tools.loopDetection.

{
  tools: {
    loopDetection: {
      enabled: true,
    },
  },
}

`tools.web`

{
  tools: {
    web: {
      search: {
        enabled: true,
        provider: "brave", // optional; omit for auto-detect
        maxResults: 5,
        timeoutSeconds: 30,
        cacheTtlMinutes: 15,
      },
      fetch: {
        enabled: true,
        provider: "firecrawl", // optional; omit for auto-detect
        maxChars: 20000,
        maxCharsCap: 20000,
        maxResponseBytes: 750000,
        timeoutSeconds: 30,
        cacheTtlMinutes: 15,
        maxRedirects: 3,
        readability: true,
        userAgent: "custom-ua",
      },
    },
  },
  plugins: {
    entries: {
      brave: {
        config: {
          webSearch: { apiKey: "brave_api_key" }, // or BRAVE_API_KEY env
        },
      },
    },
  },
}

Web-search provider credentials belong under plugins.entries.<plugin>.config.webSearch, as shown for Brave; see Web search. The tools.web values shown are defaults except provider and userAgent. maxResponseBytes clamps to 32000–10000000; maxChars clamps to maxCharsCap (raise maxCharsCap to allow larger responses).

`tools.media`

Configures inbound media understanding (image/audio/video):

{
  tools: {
    media: {
      concurrency: 2,
      models: [
        { provider: "openai", model: "gpt-4o-mini-transcribe", capabilities: ["audio"] },
        {
          type: "cli",
          command: "whisper",
          args: ["--model", "base", "{{AttachmentPath}}"],
          capabilities: ["audio"],
        },
        { provider: "ollama", model: "gemma4:26b", capabilities: ["image"] },
        { provider: "google", model: "gemini-3-flash-preview", capabilities: ["video"] },
      ],
      audio: { enabled: true, preferredModel: "openai/gpt-4o-mini-transcribe" },
      image: { enabled: true, preferredModel: "ollama/gemma4:26b" },
      video: { enabled: true },
    },
  },
}

tools.media.models is the only configured model list. Every entry declares the capabilities it handles. The optional preferredModel selector accepts provider/model, a model id, provider:<id> for provider-default entries, or cli:command; matching entries move to the front of that capability’s fallback order. Per-capability prompts, limits, request settings, scope, attachment policy, and audio transcript echo remain defaults for configured and auto-detected models; a model entry can override model-specific fields.

Media model entry fields

Provider entry (type: "provider" or omitted):

provider: API provider id (openai, anthropic, google/gemini, groq, etc.)
model: model id override
profile / preferredProfile: stored auth-profile selection

CLI entry (type: "cli"):

command: executable to run
args: templated args (supports {{AttachmentPath}}, {{AttachmentUrl}}, {{AttachmentContentType}}, {{AttachmentDir}}, {{AttachmentIndex}}, {{Prompt}}, {{MaxChars}}, etc.; openclaw doctor --fix migrates deprecated {input} placeholders to {{AttachmentPath}}). The older {{MediaPath}}, {{MediaUrl}}, {{MediaType}}, and {{MediaDir}} aliases remain available during their compatibility window but are deprecated.

Common fields:

capabilities: list containing one or more of image, audio, and video.
prompt, maxChars, maxBytes, timeoutSeconds, language: per-entry overrides.
Matching image model timeoutSeconds entries also apply when the agent calls the explicit view_image tool. For image understanding, this timeout applies to the request itself and is not reduced by earlier preparation work.
Failures fall back to the next entry.

Provider auth follows standard order: SQLite auth profiles → env vars → models.providers.*.apiKey.

`tools.agentToAgent`

{
  tools: {
    agentToAgent: {
      allow: ["home", "work"],
    },
  },
}

Cross-agent access is on by default. enabled (default true) gates cross-agent session tool calls: sessions_send to another agent, and cross-agent sessions_list, sessions_history, sessions_search, and status reads under the default tools.sessions.visibility: "all". Set enabled: false to turn cross-agent access off. Same-agent access never consults this policy. Requester-owned native subagent and ACP child sessions are the one exception: under tree or all visibility they stay reachable across agent boundaries before this policy is consulted, including with enabled: false. allow lists the agent ids or * patterns that may take part in a cross-agent call. Both the requesting agent and the target agent must match an entry. Exact ids are case-sensitive; wildcard patterns are case-insensitive.

An omitted or empty allow counts as unset: with agent-to-agent access enabled by default, every agent can reach every other agent. List every participating agent, requester and target alike, to restrict cross-agent access, as in the example above. A list containing only blank entries denies all cross-agent calls. Deleting an agent (openclaw agents delete) prunes its id from allow; if that empties the list, the policy falls back to allow-all, so re-check allow after removing agents.

`tools.sessions`

Controls which sessions can be targeted by the session tools (sessions_list, sessions_history, sessions_search, sessions_send, session_status). Default: all (every session on the Gateway, including other agents’ and other users’ transcripts). Cross-agent access is governed by tools.agentToAgent and is on by default. Use agent, tree, or self to narrow visibility.

{
  tools: {
    sessions: {
      // "self" | "tree" | "agent" | "all"
      visibility: "all",
    },
  },
}

Visibility scopes

self: only the current session key.
tree: current session + sessions spawned by the current session (subagents). When the caller is the canonical main session, it includes every same-agent session for list, history, search, send, and status.
agent: any session belonging to the current agent id (can include other users if you run per-sender sessions under the same agent id).
all: any session. Cross-agent targeting is governed by tools.agentToAgent, which is on by default.
self remains strict for main. Incognito denial remains absolute. Narrowing visibility to agent, tree, or self blocks ordinary cross-agent access; tree also permits owned native/ACP children across agent boundaries. agent does not include that exception, so keep explicit tree if your workflow relies on it.
Sandbox clamp: when the current session is sandboxed and agents.defaults.sandbox.sessionToolsVisibility="spawned" (the default), access stays limited to spawned sessions even if the caller is main or tools.sessions.visibility="all".
When not all, sessions_list includes a compact visibility field describing the effective mode and a warning that some sessions may be omitted outside the current scope.

Ambient group watches still queue activity notices and tell the main session where something happened. They do not grant access. The default all scope already covers sessions across agents, including conversations with other users. A per-peer session.dmScope separates DM context but does not restrict session tools. For narrower access, explicitly choose agent, tree, or self, or restrict agent pairs with tools.agentToAgent.allow. Set tools.agentToAgent.enabled: false to block ordinary cross-agent access; requester-owned native subagent and ACP child sessions stay reachable under tree or all. tree retains the canonical main-session exception; self restricts even main to its current session.

`tools.sessions_spawn`

Controls inline attachment support for sessions_spawn.

{
  tools: {
    sessions_spawn: {
      attachments: {
        enabled: false, // opt-in: set true to allow inline file attachments
        maxTotalBytes: 5242880, // 5 MB total across all files
        maxFiles: 50,
        maxFileBytes: 1048576, // 1 MB per file
        retainOnSessionKeep: false, // keep attachments when cleanup="keep"
      },
    },
  },
}

Attachment notes

Attachments require enabled: true.
Subagent attachments are materialized into the child workspace at .openclaw/attachments/<uuid>/ with a .manifest.json.
ACP attachments are image-only and forwarded inline to the ACP runtime after the same file count, per-file byte, and total byte limits pass.
Attachment content is automatically redacted from transcript persistence.
Base64 inputs are validated with strict alphabet/padding checks and a pre-decode size guard.
Subagent attachment file permissions are 0700 for directories and 0600 for files.
Subagent cleanup follows the cleanup policy: delete always removes attachments; keep retains them only when retainOnSessionKeep: true.

`tools.updatePlan`

Kill switch for progress_card, the durable plan and status note used for non-trivial multi-step work tracking.

{
  tools: {
    updatePlan: false, // hide progress_card from every run
  },
}

Default: true for every provider and model. Set false to keep the tool off; there is no model-specific auto-enable rule.
The tool description tells the model to keep the plan current, use at most one in_progress step, and add Markdown only when it contributes information beyond the steps.
Use progress_card in new tools.allow and tools.deny policies. Existing policies that name update_plan map to progress_card, so shipped allowlists and denylists keep their meaning.

Older configs used tools.experimental.planTool. Run openclaw doctor --fix to move the value to tools.updatePlan.

`agents.defaults.subagents`

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      subagents: {
        allowAgents: ["research"],
        model: "minimax/MiniMax-M2.7",
        maxConcurrent: 8,
        runTimeoutSeconds: 900,
        announceTimeoutMs: 120000,
        archiveAfterMinutes: 60,
      },
    },
  },
}

model: default model for spawned sub-agents. If omitted, sub-agents inherit the caller’s model.
allowAgents: default allowlist of configured target agent ids for sessions_spawn when the requester agent does not set its own subagents.allowAgents (["*"] = any configured target; default: same agent only). Stale entries whose agent config was deleted are rejected by sessions_spawn and omitted from agents_list; run openclaw doctor --fix to clean them up.
maxConcurrent: max concurrent sub-agent runs. Default: 8.
runTimeoutSeconds: timeout (seconds) for sessions_spawn when the caller does not pass its own override. Default: 0 (no timeout); the 900 shown above is a common opt-in value, not the built-in default.
announceTimeoutMs: per-call timeout (milliseconds) for gateway agent announce delivery attempts. Default: 120000. Transient retries can make the total announce wait longer than one configured timeout.
archiveAfterMinutes: minutes after a sub-agent session completes before it is auto-archived. Default: 60; 0 disables auto-archive.
Per-subagent tool policy: tools.subagents.tools.allow / tools.subagents.tools.deny.

Custom providers and base URLs

Provider plugins publish their own model catalog rows. Add custom providers via models.providers in config or ~/.openclaw/agents/<agentId>/agent/models.json. Configuring a custom/local provider baseUrl is also the narrow network trust decision for model HTTP requests: OpenClaw allows that exact scheme://host:port origin through the guarded fetch path, without adding a separate config option or trusting other private origins.

{
  models: {
    mode: "merge", // merge (default) | replace
    providers: {
      "custom-proxy": {
        baseUrl: "http://localhost:4000/v1",
        apiKey: "LITELLM_KEY",
        api: "openai-completions", // openai-completions | openai-responses | anthropic-messages | google-generative-ai | etc.
        models: [
          {
            id: "llama-3.1-8b",
            name: "Llama 3.1 8B",
            reasoning: false,
            input: ["text"],
            cost: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0 },
            contextWindow: 128000,
            contextTokens: 96000,
            maxTokens: 32000,
          },
        ],
      },
    },
  },
}

Auth and merge precedence

Use authHeader: true + headers for custom auth needs.
Override agent config root with OPENCLAW_AGENT_DIR.
Merge precedence for matching provider IDs:
- Non-empty agent models.json baseUrl values win.
- Non-empty agent apiKey values win only when that provider is not SecretRef-managed in current config/auth-profile context.
- SecretRef-managed provider apiKey values are refreshed from source markers (ENV_VAR_NAME for env refs, secretref-managed for file/exec/store refs) instead of persisting resolved secrets.
- SecretRef-managed provider header values are refreshed from source markers (secretref-env:ENV_VAR_NAME for env refs, secretref-managed for file/exec/store refs).
- Empty or missing agent apiKey/baseUrl fall back to models.providers in config.
- Matching model contextWindow/maxTokens: the explicit config value wins when present and valid (a positive finite number); otherwise the implicit/generated catalog value is used.
- Matching model contextTokens follows the same explicit-wins-else-implicit rule; use it to limit effective context without changing native model metadata.
- Provider-plugin catalogs are stored as generated plugin-owned catalog shards under the agent’s plugin state.
- Use models.mode: "replace" when you want config to fully rewrite models.json and skip merging in plugin-owned catalog shards.
- Marker persistence is source-authoritative: markers are written from the active source config snapshot (pre-resolution), not from resolved runtime secret values.

Provider field details

Top-level catalog

models.mode: provider catalog behavior (merge or replace).
models.providers: custom provider map keyed by provider id.
- Safe edits: use openclaw config set models.providers.<id> '<json>' --strict-json --merge or openclaw config set models.providers.<id>.models '<json-array>' --strict-json --merge for additive updates. config set refuses destructive replacements unless you pass --replace.

Provider connection and auth

models.providers.*.api: request adapter (openai-completions, openai-responses, openai-chatgpt-responses, anthropic-messages, google-generative-ai, google-vertex, github-copilot, bedrock-converse-stream, ollama, azure-openai-responses). For self-hosted /v1/chat/completions backends such as MLX, vLLM, SGLang, and most OpenAI-compatible local servers, use openai-completions. A custom provider with baseUrl but no api defaults to openai-completions; set openai-responses only when the backend supports /v1/responses.
models.providers.*.apiKey: provider credential (prefer SecretRef/env substitution).
models.providers.*.auth: auth strategy (api-key, token, oauth, aws-sdk).
models.providers.*.maxTokens: default output-token cap for models under this provider when the model entry does not set maxTokens.
models.providers.*.timeoutSeconds: optional per-provider model HTTP request timeout in seconds, including connect, headers, body, and total request abort handling.
models.providers.*.injectNumCtxForOpenAICompat: for Ollama + openai-completions, inject options.num_ctx into requests (default: true).
models.providers.*.authHeader: force credential transport in the Authorization header when required.
models.providers.*.baseUrl: upstream API base URL.
models.providers.*.headers: extra static headers for proxy/tenant routing.

Request transport overrides

models.providers.*.request: transport overrides for model-provider HTTP requests.

request.headers: extra headers (merged with provider defaults). Values accept SecretRef.
request.auth: auth strategy override. Modes: "provider-default" (use provider’s built-in auth), "authorization-bearer" (with token), "header" (with headerName, value, optional prefix).
request.proxy: HTTP proxy override. Modes: "env-proxy" (use HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY env vars), "explicit-proxy" (with url). Both modes accept an optional tls sub-object.
request.tls: TLS override for direct connections. Fields: ca, cert, key, passphrase (all accept SecretRef), serverName, insecureSkipVerify.
request.allowPrivateNetwork: when true, allow model-provider HTTP requests to private, CGNAT, or similar ranges through the provider HTTP fetch guard. Custom/local provider base URLs already trust the exact configured origin, except metadata, link-local, and local-use NAT64 (64:ff9b:1::/48) origins, which remain blocked without explicit opt-in. Set this to false to opt out of exact-origin trust. WebSocket uses the same request for headers/TLS but not that fetch SSRF gate. Default false.

Model catalog entries

models.providers.*.models: explicit provider model catalog entries.
models.providers.*.models.*.input: model input modalities. Use ["text"] for text-only models and ["text", "image"] for native image/vision models. Image attachments are only injected into agent turns when the selected model is marked image-capable.
models.providers.*.models.*.contextWindow: native context-window metadata for that model.
models.providers.*.models.*.contextTokens: optional active-input cap for that model; use it when you want an effective budget distinct from the model’s native contextWindow; openclaw models list shows both when they differ.

Custom provider capability declarations

Provider catalogs own compat for bundled and catalog-known model routes. Do not copy those flags into config: OpenClaw uses the catalog row when the configured api and baseUrl still identify that route. openclaw doctor --fix removes matching legacy overrides and reports divergent values for review.A compat block remains supported for a genuinely custom provider, custom model, or catalog model routed to a different endpoint. Set only capabilities verified against that endpoint:

Custom-route key	Runtime contract
`supportsStore`	Accepts the OpenAI `store` request field.
`supportsPromptCacheKey`	Accepts OpenAI prompt-cache/session-affinity keys.
`supportsDeveloperRole`	Accepts `developer` messages instead of requiring `system`.
`supportsReasoningEffort`	Accepts a reasoning-effort control.
`supportsTemperature`	Accepts `temperature` for this model and adapter.
`supportsUsageInStreaming`	Emits usage metadata in streaming responses.
`supportsInstructions`	Responses API only: accepts the system prompt via top-level `instructions` instead of embedded in `input`. Defaults to `true` only for native OpenAI and xAI’s main route — the two routes with confirmed contract evidence. Every other route, bundled or custom, defaults to `false`; set explicitly once verified against that endpoint.
`supportsTools`	Supports structured tool/function calling. Set `false` to disable tools.
`supportsStrictMode`	Accepts strict tool schemas.
`requiresStringContent`	Requires plain-string Chat Completions message content.
`strictMessageKeys`	Requires outgoing messages to contain only accepted keys.
`visibleReasoningDetailTypes`	Names reasoning detail block types safe to show in transcripts.
`supportedReasoningEfforts`	Lists the endpoint’s accepted reasoning labels.
`reasoningEffortMap`	Maps OpenClaw thinking labels to endpoint-specific labels.
`maxTokensField`	Selects `max_tokens` or `max_completion_tokens`.
`thinkingFormat`	Selects the endpoint’s reasoning payload dialect.
`requiresToolResultName`	Requires a tool name on tool-result messages.
`requiresAssistantAfterToolResult`	Requires an assistant message after tool results.
`requiresThinkingAsText`	Replays reasoning as text rather than structured content.
`requiresReasoningContentOnAssistantMessages`	Preserves DeepSeek-style `reasoning_content` during replay.
`toolSchemaProfile`	Selects a tool-schema normalization profile. Custom model entries recognize `llamacpp` and `gemini`. The `llamacpp` profile removes `pattern` and `maxLength` values at or above 2000; built-in `llama-cpp`, `ollama`, and `lmstudio` providers apply the same cleaner automatically. Custom provider IDs pointed at llama-server must select it explicitly. See the llama.cpp example below.
`unsupportedToolSchemaKeywords`	Removes named JSON Schema keywords rejected by the endpoint before tool schemas are sent. Use this for endpoint-specific gaps beyond a profile’s targeted transformations.
`toolCallArgumentsEncoding`	Selects the endpoint’s tool-call argument encoding.
`requiresOpenAiAnthropicToolPayload`	Converts OpenAI-shaped tool calls to Anthropic-family payloads.

Amazon Bedrock discovery

plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery: Bedrock auto-discovery settings root.
plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery.enabled: turn implicit discovery on/off.
plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery.region: AWS region for discovery.
plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery.providerFilter: optional provider-id filter for targeted discovery.
plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery.refreshInterval: polling interval for discovery refresh.
plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery.defaultContextWindow: fallback context window for discovered models.
plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery.defaultMaxTokens: fallback max output tokens for discovered models.

Interactive custom-provider onboarding infers image input for known vision-model-id patterns, including GPT-4o/GPT-4.1/GPT-5+, the o1/o3/o4 reasoning families, Claude, Gemini, any -vl-suffixed id (Qwen-VL and similar), and named families such as LLaVA, Pixtral, InternVL, Mllama, MiniCPM-V, and GLM-4V; it skips the extra question for known text-only families (Llama, DeepSeek, Mistral/Mixtral, Kimi/Moonshot, Codestral, Devstral, Phi, QwQ, CodeLlama, and bare Qwen ids without a vl/vision suffix). Unknown model IDs still prompt for image support. Non-interactive onboarding uses the same inference; pass --custom-image-input to force image-capable metadata or --custom-text-input to force text-only metadata.

Provider examples

Cerebras (GLM 4.7 / GPT OSS)

The official external cerebras provider plugin can configure this via openclaw onboard --auth-choice cerebras-api-key. Use explicit provider config only when overriding defaults.

{
  env: { vars: { CEREBRAS_API_KEY: "sk-..." } },
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      model: {
        primary: "cerebras/zai-glm-4.7",
        fallbacks: ["cerebras/gpt-oss-120b"],
      },
      models: {
        "cerebras/zai-glm-4.7": { alias: "GLM 4.7 (Cerebras)" },
        "cerebras/gpt-oss-120b": { alias: "GPT OSS 120B (Cerebras)" },
      },
    },
  },
  models: {
    mode: "merge",
    providers: {
      cerebras: {
        baseUrl: "https://api.cerebras.ai/v1",
        apiKey: "${CEREBRAS_API_KEY}",
        api: "openai-completions",
        models: [
          { id: "zai-glm-4.7", name: "GLM 4.7 (Cerebras)" },
          { id: "gpt-oss-120b", name: "GPT OSS 120B (Cerebras)" },
        ],
      },
    },
  },
}

Use cerebras/zai-glm-4.7 for Cerebras; zai/glm-4.7 for Z.AI direct.

Kimi Coding

{
  env: { vars: { KIMI_API_KEY: "sk-..." } },
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      model: { primary: "kimi/kimi-for-coding" },
      models: { "kimi/kimi-for-coding": { alias: "Kimi Code" } },
    },
  },
}

Anthropic-compatible, built-in provider. Shortcut: openclaw onboard --auth-choice kimi-code-api-key.

Local models (llama.cpp / llama-server)

The canonical llama-cpp provider applies the llama.cpp schema cleaner in managed and existing-server modes. If you instead point a custom provider ID at a remote llama-server (or another OpenAI-compatible llama.cpp endpoint), set compat.toolSchemaProfile: "llamacpp" on each model whose chat template compiles tool arguments into GBNF. The profile removes pattern and maxLength values at or above 2000, covering the cron tool’s trigger.script limit of 65536. It is a targeted mitigation, not complete compatibility for every JSON Schema constraint or minLength.

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      model: { primary: "my-llamacpp/qwen35" },
    },
  },
  models: {
    mode: "merge",
    providers: {
      "my-llamacpp": {
        baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1",
        apiKey: "llamacpp-no-key",
        api: "openai-completions",
        models: [
          {
            id: "qwen35",
            name: "Qwen3.5 (llama-server)",
            contextWindow: 8192,
            maxTokens: 2048,
            compat: {
              supportsTools: true,
              toolSchemaProfile: "llamacpp",
            },
          },
        ],
      },
    },
  },
}

On older builds without toolSchemaProfile, the broader fallback is

compat.unsupportedToolSchemaKeywords: ["pattern", "patternProperties", "format", "propertyNames", "uniqueItems", "contains", "minContains", "maxContains", "minLength", "maxLength"]

. Unlike the profile, this removes every listed keyword unconditionally.

Local models (LM Studio)

See Local Models. TL;DR: run a large local model via LM Studio Responses API on serious hardware; keep hosted models merged for fallback.

MiniMax M3 (direct)

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      model: { primary: "minimax/MiniMax-M3" },
      models: {
        "minimax/MiniMax-M3": { alias: "Minimax" },
      },
    },
  },
  models: {
    mode: "merge",
    providers: {
      minimax: {
        baseUrl: "https://api.minimax.io/anthropic",
        apiKey: "${MINIMAX_API_KEY}",
        api: "anthropic-messages",
        models: [
          {
            id: "MiniMax-M3",
            name: "MiniMax M3",
            reasoning: true,
            input: ["text", "image"],
            cost: { input: 0.6, output: 2.4, cacheRead: 0.12, cacheWrite: 0 },
            contextWindow: 1000000,
            maxTokens: 131072,
          },
        ],
      },
    },
  },
}

Set MINIMAX_API_KEY. Shortcuts: openclaw onboard --auth-choice minimax-global-api or openclaw onboard --auth-choice minimax-cn-api. The model catalog defaults to M3 and also includes the M2.7 variants. On the Anthropic-compatible streaming path, OpenClaw disables MiniMax M2.x thinking by default unless you explicitly set thinking yourself; MiniMax-M3 (and M3.x) stays on the provider’s omitted/adaptive thinking path by default. /fast on or params.fastMode: true rewrites MiniMax-M2.7 to MiniMax-M2.7-highspeed.

Moonshot AI (Kimi)

{
  env: { vars: { MOONSHOT_API_KEY: "sk-..." } },
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      model: { primary: "moonshot/kimi-k2.6" },
      models: { "moonshot/kimi-k2.6": { alias: "Kimi K2.6" } },
    },
  },
  models: {
    mode: "merge",
    providers: {
      moonshot: {
        baseUrl: "https://api.moonshot.ai/v1",
        apiKey: "${MOONSHOT_API_KEY}",
        api: "openai-completions",
        models: [
          {
            id: "kimi-k2.6",
            name: "Kimi K2.6",
            reasoning: false,
            input: ["text", "image"],
            cost: { input: 0.95, output: 4, cacheRead: 0.16, cacheWrite: 0 },
            contextWindow: 262144,
            maxTokens: 262144,
          },
        ],
      },
    },
  },
}

For the China endpoint: baseUrl: "https://api.moonshot.cn/v1" or openclaw onboard --auth-choice moonshot-api-key-cn.Native Moonshot endpoints advertise streaming usage compatibility on the shared openai-completions transport, and OpenClaw keys that off endpoint capabilities rather than the built-in provider id alone.

OpenCode

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      model: { primary: "opencode/claude-opus-4-6" },
      models: { "opencode/claude-opus-4-6": { alias: "Opus" } },
    },
  },
}

Set OPENCODE_API_KEY (or OPENCODE_ZEN_API_KEY). Use opencode/... refs for the Zen catalog or opencode-go/... refs for the Go catalog. Shortcut: openclaw onboard --auth-choice opencode-zen or openclaw onboard --auth-choice opencode-go.

Synthetic (Anthropic-compatible)

{
  env: { vars: { SYNTHETIC_API_KEY: "sk-..." } },
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      model: { primary: "synthetic/hf:MiniMaxAI/MiniMax-M3" },
      models: { "synthetic/hf:MiniMaxAI/MiniMax-M3": { alias: "MiniMax M3" } },
    },
  },
  models: {
    mode: "merge",
    providers: {
      synthetic: {
        baseUrl: "https://api.synthetic.new/anthropic",
        apiKey: "${SYNTHETIC_API_KEY}",
        api: "anthropic-messages",
        models: [
          {
            id: "hf:MiniMaxAI/MiniMax-M3",
            name: "MiniMax M3",
            reasoning: true,
            input: ["text", "image"],
            cost: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0 },
            contextWindow: 262144,
            maxTokens: 65536,
          },
        ],
      },
    },
  },
}

Base URL should omit /v1 (Anthropic client appends it). Shortcut: openclaw onboard --auth-choice synthetic-api-key.

Z.AI (GLM-4.7)

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      model: { primary: "zai/glm-4.7" },
      models: { "zai/glm-4.7": {} },
    },
  },
}

Set ZAI_API_KEY. Model refs use the canonical zai/* provider ID. Shortcut: openclaw onboard --auth-choice zai-api-key.

General endpoint: https://api.z.ai/api/paas/v4
Coding endpoint: https://api.z.ai/api/coding/paas/v4
The default zai-api-key auth choice probes your key and auto-detects which endpoint it belongs to (falling back to a prompt, defaulting to Global, if detection is inconclusive). Dedicated CN and Coding-Plan auth choices are also available for explicit selection.
For the general endpoint, define a custom provider with the base URL override.

Configuration — agents
Configuration — channels
Configuration reference — other top-level keys
Tools and plugins

Gateway

Remote access

Security

Nodes and media

Web interfaces

Configuration — tools and custom providers

Tools

Tool profiles

Tool groups

MCP and plugin tools inside sandbox tool policy

`tools.codeMode`

`tools.allow` / `tools.deny`

`tools.byProvider`

`tools.toolsBySender`

`tools.elevated`

`tools.github`

`tools.exec`

`tools.loopDetection`

`tools.web`

`tools.media`

`tools.agentToAgent`

`tools.sessions`

`tools.sessions_spawn`

`tools.updatePlan`

`agents.defaults.subagents`

Custom providers and base URLs

Provider field details

Custom provider capability declarations

Provider examples

​Tools

​Tool profiles

​Tool groups

​MCP and plugin tools inside sandbox tool policy

​tools.codeMode

​tools.allow / tools.deny

​tools.byProvider

​tools.toolsBySender

​tools.elevated

​tools.github

​tools.exec

​tools.loopDetection

​tools.web

​tools.media

​tools.agentToAgent

​tools.sessions

​tools.sessions_spawn

​tools.updatePlan

​agents.defaults.subagents

​Custom providers and base URLs

​Provider field details

​Custom provider capability declarations

​Provider examples

​Related

Tools

Tool profiles

Tool groups

MCP and plugin tools inside sandbox tool policy

`tools.codeMode`

`tools.allow` / `tools.deny`

`tools.byProvider`

`tools.toolsBySender`

`tools.elevated`

`tools.github`

`tools.exec`

`tools.loopDetection`

`tools.web`

`tools.media`

`tools.agentToAgent`

`tools.sessions`

`tools.sessions_spawn`

`tools.updatePlan`

`agents.defaults.subagents`

Custom providers and base URLs

Provider field details

Custom provider capability declarations

Provider examples

Related