Trusted proxy auth

Security-sensitive feature. This mode delegates authentication entirely to your reverse proxy. Misconfiguration can expose your Gateway to unauthorized access. Read this page carefully before enabling.

When to use

Use trusted-proxy auth mode when:

• You run OpenClaw behind an identity-aware proxy (Pomerium, Caddy + OAuth, nginx + oauth2-proxy, Traefik + forward auth).
• Your proxy handles all authentication and passes user identity via headers.
• You’re in a Kubernetes or container environment where the proxy is the only path to the Gateway.
• You’re hitting WebSocket 1008 unauthorized errors because browsers can’t pass tokens in WS payloads.

When NOT to use

• If your proxy doesn’t authenticate users (just a TLS terminator or load balancer).
• If there’s any path to the Gateway that bypasses the proxy (firewall holes, internal network access).
• If you’re unsure whether your proxy correctly strips/overwrites forwarded headers.
• If you only need personal single-user access (consider Tailscale Serve + loopback for simpler setup).

How it works

1. Proxy authenticates the user

   Your reverse proxy authenticates users (OAuth, OIDC, SAML, etc.).

2. Proxy adds an identity header

   Proxy adds a header with the authenticated user identity (e.g., x-forwarded-user: [e-mail]).

3. Gateway verifies trusted source

   OpenClaw checks that the request came from a trusted proxy IP (configured in gateway.trustedProxies).

4. Gateway extracts identity

   OpenClaw extracts the user identity from the configured header.

5. Authorize

   If everything checks out, the request is authorized.

Control UI pairing behavior

When gateway.auth.mode = "trusted-proxy" is active and the request passes trusted-proxy checks, Control UI WebSocket sessions can connect without device pairing identity.

Implications:

• Pairing is no longer the primary gate for Control UI access in this mode.
• Your reverse proxy auth policy and allowUsers become the effective access control.
• Keep gateway ingress locked to trusted proxy IPs only (gateway.trustedProxies + firewall).

Scope clearing without device identity: Because the browser over plain HTTP cannot create the device identity that OpenClaw uses to bind operator scopes, trusted-proxy WebSocket connections that lack device identity have their self-declared scopes cleared to an empty set. The connection is allowed, but scope-gated methods (operator.read, operator.write, etc.) fail with missing scope.

To preserve operator scopes on trusted-proxy WebSocket connections without device identity, set gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth: true. This is a break-glass flag (openclaw security audit reports it as critical). Use it only when the reverse proxy is the sole path to the Gateway and device identity cannot be established.

Configuration

{
  gateway: {
    // Trusted-proxy auth expects requests from a non-loopback trusted proxy source by default
    bind: "lan",

    // CRITICAL: Only add your proxy's IP(s) here
    trustedProxies: ["10.0.0.1", "172.17.0.1"],

    auth: {
      mode: "trusted-proxy",
      trustedProxy: {
        // Header containing authenticated user identity (required)
        userHeader: "x-forwarded-user",

        // Optional: headers that MUST be present (proxy verification)
        requiredHeaders: ["x-forwarded-proto", "x-forwarded-host"],

        // Optional: restrict to specific users (empty = allow all)
        allowUsers: ["[e-mail]", "[e-mail]"],

        // Optional: allow a same-host loopback proxy after explicit opt-in
        allowLoopback: false,
      },
    },
  },
}

Important runtime rules

• Trusted-proxy auth rejects loopback-source requests (127.0.0.1, ::1, loopback CIDRs) by default.
• Same-host loopback reverse proxies do not satisfy trusted-proxy auth unless you explicitly set gateway.auth.trustedProxy.allowLoopback = true and include the loopback address in gateway.trustedProxies.
• allowLoopback trusts local processes on the Gateway host to the same degree as the reverse proxy. Enable it only when the Gateway is still firewalled from direct remote access and the local proxy strips or overwrites client-supplied identity headers.
• Internal Gateway clients that do not travel through the reverse proxy should use gateway.auth.password / OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD, not trusted-proxy identity headers.
• Non-loopback Control UI deployments still need explicit gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins.
• Forwarded-header evidence overrides loopback locality for local direct fallback. If a request arrives on loopback but carries Forwarded, any X-Forwarded-*, or X-Real-IP header evidence, that evidence disqualifies local-direct password fallback and device-identity gating. With allowLoopback: true, trusted-proxy auth can still accept the request as a same-host proxy request, while requiredHeaders and allowUsers continue to apply.

Configuration reference

gateway.trustedProxies · string[] · required

Array of proxy IP addresses to trust. Requests from other IPs are rejected.

gateway.auth.mode · string · required

Must be "trusted-proxy".

gateway.auth.trustedProxy.userHeader · string · required

Header name containing the authenticated user identity.

gateway.auth.trustedProxy.requiredHeaders · string[]

Additional headers that must be present for the request to be trusted.

gateway.auth.trustedProxy.allowUsers · string[]

Allowlist of user identities. Empty means allow all authenticated users.

gateway.auth.trustedProxy.allowLoopback · boolean

Opt-in support for same-host loopback reverse proxies. Defaults to false.

Only enable allowLoopback when the local reverse proxy is the intended trust boundary. Any local process that can connect to the Gateway can try to send proxy identity headers, so keep direct Gateway access private to the host and require proxy-owned headers such as x-forwarded-proto or a signed assertion header where your proxy supports one.

TLS termination and HSTS

Use one TLS termination point and apply HSTS there.

Proxy TLS termination (recommended)

When your reverse proxy handles HTTPS for https://control.example.com, set Strict-Transport-Security at the proxy for that domain.

• Good fit for internet-facing deployments.
• Keeps certificate + HTTP hardening policy in one place.
• OpenClaw can stay on loopback HTTP behind the proxy.

Example header value:

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

Gateway TLS termination

If OpenClaw itself serves HTTPS directly (no TLS-terminating proxy), set:

{
  gateway: {
    tls: { enabled: true },
    http: {
      securityHeaders: {
        strictTransportSecurity: "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains",
      },
    },
  },
}

strictTransportSecurity accepts a string header value, or false to disable explicitly.

Rollout guidance

• Start with a short max age first (for example max-age=300) while validating traffic.
• Increase to long-lived values (for example max-age=31536000) only after confidence is high.
• Add includeSubDomains only if every subdomain is HTTPS-ready.
• Use preload only if you intentionally meet preload requirements for your full domain set.
• Loopback-only local development does not benefit from HSTS.

Proxy setup examples

Pomerium

Pomerium passes identity in x-pomerium-claim-email (or other claim headers) and a JWT in x-pomerium-jwt-assertion.

{
  gateway: {
    bind: "lan",
    trustedProxies: ["10.0.0.1"], // Pomerium's IP
    auth: {
      mode: "trusted-proxy",
      trustedProxy: {
        userHeader: "x-pomerium-claim-email",
        requiredHeaders: ["x-pomerium-jwt-assertion"],
      },
    },
  },
}

Pomerium config snippet:

routes:
  - from: https://openclaw.example.com
    to: http://openclaw-gateway:18789
    policy:
      - allow:
          or:
            - email:
                is: [e-mail]
    pass_identity_headers: true

Caddy with OAuth

Caddy with the caddy-security plugin can authenticate users and pass identity headers.

{
  gateway: {
    bind: "lan",
    trustedProxies: ["10.0.0.1"], // Caddy/sidecar proxy IP
    auth: {
      mode: "trusted-proxy",
      trustedProxy: {
        userHeader: "x-forwarded-user",
      },
    },
  },
}

Caddyfile snippet:

openclaw.example.com {
    authenticate with oauth2_provider
    authorize with policy1

    reverse_proxy openclaw:18789 {
        header_up X-Forwarded-User {http.auth.user.email}
    }
}

nginx + oauth2-proxy

oauth2-proxy authenticates users and passes identity in x-auth-request-email.

{
  gateway: {
    bind: "lan",
    trustedProxies: ["10.0.0.1"], // nginx/oauth2-proxy IP
    auth: {
      mode: "trusted-proxy",
      trustedProxy: {
        userHeader: "x-auth-request-email",
      },
    },
  },
}

nginx config snippet:

location / {
    auth_request /oauth2/auth;
    auth_request_set $user $upstream_http_x_auth_request_email;

    proxy_pass http://openclaw:18789;
    proxy_set_header X-Auth-Request-Email $user;
    proxy_http_version 1.1;
    proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
    proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
}

Traefik with forward auth

{
  gateway: {
    bind: "lan",
    trustedProxies: ["172.17.0.1"], // Traefik container IP
    auth: {
      mode: "trusted-proxy",
      trustedProxy: {
        userHeader: "x-forwarded-user",
      },
    },
  },
}

Mixed token configuration

OpenClaw rejects ambiguous configurations where both a gateway.auth.token (or OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN) and trusted-proxy mode are active at the same time. Mixed token configs can cause loopback requests to silently authenticate on the wrong auth path.

If you see a mixed_trusted_proxy_token error on startup:

• Remove the shared token when using trusted-proxy mode, or
• Switch gateway.auth.mode to "token" if you intend token-based auth.

Loopback trusted-proxy identity headers still fail closed: same-host callers are not silently authenticated as proxy users. Internal OpenClaw callers that bypass the proxy may authenticate with gateway.auth.password / OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD instead. Token fallback remains intentionally unsupported in trusted-proxy mode.

Operator scopes header

Trusted-proxy auth is an identity-bearing HTTP mode, so callers may optionally declare operator scopes with x-openclaw-scopes.

Note: x-openclaw-scopes applies to HTTP endpoints only. WebSocket scopes are determined by the Gateway protocol handshake and device identity binding. For WebSocket scope behavior with trusted-proxy, see Control UI pairing behavior.

Examples:

• x-openclaw-scopes: operator.read
• x-openclaw-scopes: operator.read,operator.write
• x-openclaw-scopes: operator.admin,operator.write

Behavior:

• When the header is present, OpenClaw honors the declared scope set.
• When the header is present but empty, the request declares no operator scopes.
• When the header is absent, normal identity-bearing HTTP APIs fall back to the standard operator default scope set.
• Gateway-auth plugin HTTP routes are narrower by default: when x-openclaw-scopes is absent, their runtime scope falls back to operator.write.
• Browser-origin HTTP requests still have to pass gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins (or deliberate Host-header fallback mode) even after trusted-proxy auth succeeds.

Practical rule: send x-openclaw-scopes explicitly when you want a trusted-proxy request to be narrower than the defaults, or when a gateway-auth plugin route needs something stronger than write scope.

Security checklist

Before enabling trusted-proxy auth, verify:

• Proxy is the only path: The Gateway port is firewalled from everything except your proxy.
• trustedProxies is minimal: Only your actual proxy IPs, not entire subnets.
• Loopback proxy source is deliberate: trusted-proxy auth fails closed for loopback-source requests unless gateway.auth.trustedProxy.allowLoopback is explicitly enabled for a same-host proxy.
• Proxy strips headers: Your proxy overwrites (not appends) x-forwarded-* headers from clients.
• TLS termination: Your proxy handles TLS; users connect via HTTPS.
• allowedOrigins is explicit: Non-loopback Control UI uses explicit gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins.
• allowUsers is set (recommended): Restrict to known users rather than allowing anyone authenticated.
• No mixed token config: Do not set both gateway.auth.token and gateway.auth.mode: "trusted-proxy".
• Local password fallback is private: If you configure gateway.auth.password for internal direct callers, keep the Gateway port firewalled so non-proxy remote clients cannot reach it directly.

Security audit

openclaw security audit will flag trusted-proxy auth with a critical severity finding. This is intentional — it’s a reminder that you’re delegating security to your proxy setup.

The audit checks for:

• Base gateway.trusted_proxy_auth warning/critical reminder
• Missing trustedProxies configuration
• Missing userHeader configuration
• Empty allowUsers (allows any authenticated user)
• Enabled allowLoopback for same-host proxy sources
• Wildcard or missing browser-origin policy on exposed Control UI surfaces

Troubleshooting

trusted_proxy_untrusted_source

The request didn’t come from an IP in gateway.trustedProxies. Check:

• Is the proxy IP correct? (Docker container IPs can change.)
• Is there a load balancer in front of your proxy?
• Use docker inspect or kubectl get pods -o wide to find actual IPs.

trusted_proxy_loopback_source

OpenClaw rejected a loopback-source trusted-proxy request.

Check:

• Is the proxy connecting from 127.0.0.1 / ::1?
• Are you trying to use trusted-proxy auth with a same-host loopback reverse proxy?

Fix:

• Prefer token/password auth for internal same-host clients that do not go through the proxy, or
• Route through a non-loopback trusted proxy address and keep that IP in gateway.trustedProxies, or
• For a deliberate same-host reverse proxy, set gateway.auth.trustedProxy.allowLoopback = true, keep the loopback address in gateway.trustedProxies, and make sure the proxy strips or overwrites identity headers.

trusted_proxy_user_missing

The user header was empty or missing. Check:

• Is your proxy configured to pass identity headers?
• Is the header name correct? (case-insensitive, but spelling matters)
• Is the user actually authenticated at the proxy?

trusted_proxy_missing_header_*

A required header wasn’t present. Check:

• Your proxy configuration for those specific headers.
• Whether headers are being stripped somewhere in the chain.

trusted_proxy_user_not_allowed

The user is authenticated but not in allowUsers. Either add them or remove the allowlist.

trusted_proxy_origin_not_allowed

Trusted-proxy auth succeeded, but the browser Origin header did not pass Control UI origin checks.

Check:

• gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins includes the exact browser origin.
• You are not relying on wildcard origins unless you intentionally want allow-all behavior.
• If you intentionally use Host-header fallback mode, gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback=true is set deliberately.

Connection succeeds but methods report missing scope

The WebSocket connects, but chat.history or sessions.list fails with missing scope: operator.read.

This is expected for trusted-proxy WebSocket connections without device identity. Connections lacking device identity have their scopes cleared. The browser cannot generate device identity over plain HTTP.

Fix:

• Set gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth: true to preserve operator scopes on trusted-proxy WebSocket connections, or
• Use device identity pairing so scopes are bound to the device token.

WebSocket still failing

Make sure your proxy:

• Supports WebSocket upgrades (Upgrade: websocket, Connection: upgrade).
• Passes the identity headers on WebSocket upgrade requests (not just HTTP).
• Doesn’t have a separate auth path for WebSocket connections.

Migration from token auth

If you’re moving from token auth to trusted-proxy:

1. Configure the proxy

   Configure your proxy to authenticate users and pass headers.

2. Test the proxy independently

   Test the proxy setup independently (curl with headers).

3. Update OpenClaw config

   Update OpenClaw config with trusted-proxy auth.

4. Restart the Gateway

   Restart the Gateway.

5. Test WebSocket

   Test WebSocket connections from the Control UI.

6. Audit

   Run openclaw security audit and review findings.

Related

• Configuration — config reference
• Remote access — other remote access patterns
• Security — full security guide
• Tailscale — simpler alternative for tailnet-only access