macOS signing

mac signing (debug builds)

scripts/package-mac-app.sh builds a staged app, calls scripts/codesign-mac-app.sh, and verifies the signed worker before replacing dist/OpenClaw.app. TCC permissions are tied to the bundle ID and code signature; keeping both stable (and the app at a fixed path) across rebuilds keeps macOS from forgetting TCC grants (notifications, accessibility, screen recording, mic, speech).

• Debug bundle identifier defaults to ai.openclaw.mac.debug (override with BUNDLE_ID=...).
• Node: >=22.22.3 <23, >=24.15.0 <25, or >=25.9.0 (repo package.json engines). The packager also builds the Control UI (pnpm ui:build).
• Requires a real signing identity by default; the codesign script exits with an error if none is found and ALLOW_ADHOC_SIGNING is not set. Ad-hoc signing (SIGN_IDENTITY="-") is explicit opt-in and does not persist TCC permissions across rebuilds. See macOS permissions.
• Reads SIGN_IDENTITY from the environment (e.g. export SIGN_IDENTITY="Apple Development: Your Name (TEAMID)", or a Developer ID Application cert). Without it, codesign-mac-app.sh auto-selects an identity in this order: Developer ID Application, Apple Distribution, Apple Development, then the first valid codesigning identity found.
• SIGN_IDENTITY also accepts a certificate SHA-1 hash to distinguish certificates with the same common name.
• CODESIGN_TIMESTAMP=auto (default) enables trusted timestamps for Developer ID Application signatures selected by name or certificate hash. Set on/off to force either way.
• Stamps Info.plist with OpenClawBuildTimestamp (ISO8601 UTC) and OpenClawGitCommit (full 40-character hexadecimal commit, or unknown for local builds when unavailable) so the About tab can show build, git, and debug/release channel.
• Audits native-signature format and Team IDs after signing. Metadata failures, non-native signatures, missing Team IDs, and mismatched Team IDs fail by default. SKIP_TEAM_ID_CHECK=1 skips only the Team ID comparison; native-signature format checks still run.
• Signs the private worker’s native code before sealing the app. Only the worker’s bin/node and Claude Agent SDK claude executables included by an explicitly bundled plugin receive JIT memory entitlements; other native helpers and libraries are plain-signed, with library validation retained and the app’s signing identity required. The bundled Anthropic plugin uses the separately installed Claude Code executable. Packaging verifies each requested architecture’s native capabilities and worker readiness in temporary state before and after signing.

Signing uses /usr/bin/python3 to scan file headers and batches candidates through /usr/bin/file. Apple’s /usr/bin/otool then checks native headers for every architecture, including fat64 containers that file reports as data. Mixed signing categories and malformed native headers stop signing. Java classes, static archives, and Mach-O linker, debug, and core artifacts are resource-sealed rather than directly signed. Discovery opens directories without following symlinks and classifies opened file descriptors rather than redirectable paths. It does not run the bundled Node to sign itself. Before publishing, the scan validates every observed input, including directory namespaces and resources omitted from the native list. It rejects incomplete traversal and observed changes; this is not an atomic filesystem snapshot.

The signature audit also requires a native Mach-O signature. Some Apple toolchains return success while signing raw fat64 as generic data, without native entitlements; that result is rejected. The signer does not thin or convert input containers. Rebuild unsupported native payloads as codesign-compatible code before packaging rather than relying on generic-signature verification.

App and Sparkle bundle owners are sealed once, after their nested code; signing a bundle’s main executable separately would also reseal that bundle’s resources. A fresh inventory after the app is sealed feeds the Team ID and elevation audits; scanner or classifier failures stop signing. Worker portability checks keep each architecture’s loader paths separate and reject nonportable dependencies and broken or escaping symlinks.

Sign a private staged copy that no other process modifies. Hardlinked files and special files such as FIFOs are rejected before attribute cleanup; copy or rebuild the bundle if this validation fails. Attribute cleanup and signing use macOS /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to restrict filesystem writes to the fixed app and temporary signing directories, with extra inherited file descriptors closed. Signing fails if this mutation boundary cannot be started; there is no unrestricted fallback.

Usage

# from repo root
scripts/package-mac-app.sh                                                      # auto-selects identity; errors if none found
SIGN_IDENTITY="Developer ID Application: Your Name" scripts/package-mac-app.sh   # real cert
ALLOW_ADHOC_SIGNING=1 scripts/package-mac-app.sh                                 # ad-hoc (permissions will not stick)
SIGN_IDENTITY="-" scripts/package-mac-app.sh                                     # explicit ad-hoc (same caveat)
DISABLE_LIBRARY_VALIDATION=1 scripts/package-mac-app.sh                          # dev-only Sparkle Team ID mismatch workaround

Ad-hoc signing note

SIGN_IDENTITY="-" disables the Hardened Runtime (--options runtime) to prevent crashes when the app loads embedded frameworks (like Sparkle) that do not share the same Team ID. Ad-hoc signatures also break TCC permission persistence; see macOS permissions for recovery steps.

Build metadata for About

The About tab reads OpenClawBuildTimestamp and OpenClawGitCommit from Info.plist to show version, build date, git commit, and whether the build is DEBUG (via #if DEBUG). Re-run the packager after code changes to refresh these values.

Related

• macOS app
• macOS permissions