fs.state_dir.perms_world_writable | critical | Other users/processes can modify full OpenClaw state | filesystem perms on ~/.openclaw | yes |
fs.state_dir.perms_group_writable | warn | Group users can modify full OpenClaw state | filesystem perms on ~/.openclaw | yes |
fs.state_dir.perms_readable | warn | State dir is readable by others | filesystem perms on ~/.openclaw | yes |
fs.state_dir.symlink | warn | State dir target becomes another trust boundary | state dir filesystem layout | no |
fs.config.perms_writable | critical | Others can change auth/tool policy/config | filesystem perms on ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json | yes |
fs.config.symlink | warn | Symlinked config files are unsupported for writes and add another trust boundary | replace with a regular config file or point OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH at the real file | no |
fs.config.perms_group_readable | warn | Group users can read config tokens/settings | filesystem perms on config file | yes |
fs.config.perms_world_readable | critical | Config can expose tokens/settings | filesystem perms on config file | yes |
fs.config_include.perms_writable | critical | Config include file can be modified by others | include-file perms referenced from openclaw.json | yes |
fs.config_include.perms_group_readable | warn | Group users can read included secrets/settings | include-file perms referenced from openclaw.json | yes |
fs.config_include.perms_world_readable | critical | Included secrets/settings are world-readable | include-file perms referenced from openclaw.json | yes |
fs.auth_profiles.perms_writable | critical | Others can inject or replace stored model credentials | agents/<agentId>/agent/auth-profiles.json perms | yes |
fs.auth_profiles.perms_readable | warn | Others can read API keys and OAuth tokens | agents/<agentId>/agent/auth-profiles.json perms | yes |
fs.credentials_dir.perms_writable | critical | Others can modify channel pairing/credential state | filesystem perms on ~/.openclaw/credentials | yes |
fs.credentials_dir.perms_readable | warn | Others can read channel credential state | filesystem perms on ~/.openclaw/credentials | yes |
fs.sessions_store.perms_readable | warn | Others can read session transcripts/metadata | session store perms | yes |
fs.log_file.perms_readable | warn | Others can read redacted-but-still-sensitive logs | gateway log file perms | yes |
fs.synced_dir | warn | State/config in iCloud/Dropbox/Drive broadens token/transcript exposure | move config/state off synced folders | no |
gateway.bind_no_auth | critical | Remote bind without shared secret | gateway.bind, gateway.auth.* | no |
gateway.loopback_no_auth | critical | Reverse-proxied loopback may become unauthenticated | gateway.auth.*, proxy setup | no |
gateway.trusted_proxies_missing | warn | Reverse-proxy headers are present but not trusted | gateway.trustedProxies | no |
gateway.http.no_auth | warn/critical | Gateway HTTP APIs reachable with auth.mode="none" | gateway.auth.mode, gateway.http.endpoints.*, plugins.entries.admin-http-rpc | no |
gateway.http.session_key_override_enabled | info | HTTP API callers can override sessionKey | gateway.http.allowSessionKeyOverride | no |
gateway.tools_invoke_http.dangerous_allow | warn/critical | Re-enables dangerous tools over HTTP API for owner/admin callers | gateway.tools.allow | no |
gateway.nodes.allow_commands_dangerous | warn/critical | Enables high-impact node commands (desktop input/camera/screen/contacts/calendar/SMS) | gateway.nodes.allowCommands | no |
gateway.nodes.deny_commands_ineffective | warn | Pattern-like deny entries do not match shell text or groups | gateway.nodes.denyCommands | no |
gateway.tailscale_funnel | critical | Public internet exposure | gateway.tailscale.mode | no |
gateway.tailscale_serve | info | Tailnet exposure is enabled via Serve | gateway.tailscale.mode | no |
gateway.control_ui.allowed_origins_required | critical | Non-loopback Control UI without explicit browser-origin allowlist | gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins | no |
gateway.control_ui.allowed_origins_wildcard | warn/critical | allowedOrigins=["*"] disables browser-origin allowlisting | gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins | no |
gateway.control_ui.host_header_origin_fallback | warn/critical | Enables Host-header origin fallback (DNS rebinding hardening downgrade) | gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback | no |
gateway.control_ui.insecure_auth | warn | Insecure-auth compatibility toggle enabled | gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth | no |
gateway.control_ui.device_auth_disabled | critical | Disables device identity check | gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth | no |
gateway.real_ip_fallback_enabled | warn/critical | Trusting X-Real-IP fallback can enable source-IP spoofing via proxy misconfig | gateway.allowRealIpFallback, gateway.trustedProxies | no |
gateway.token_too_short | warn | Short shared token is easier to brute force | gateway.auth.token | no |
gateway.auth_no_rate_limit | warn | Exposed auth without rate limiting increases brute-force risk | gateway.auth.rateLimit | no |
gateway.trusted_proxy_auth | critical | Proxy identity now becomes the auth boundary | gateway.auth.mode="trusted-proxy" | no |
gateway.trusted_proxy_no_proxies | critical | Trusted-proxy auth without trusted proxy IPs is unsafe | gateway.trustedProxies | no |
gateway.trusted_proxy_no_user_header | critical | Trusted-proxy auth cannot resolve user identity safely | gateway.auth.trustedProxy.userHeader | no |
gateway.trusted_proxy_no_allowlist | warn | Trusted-proxy auth accepts any authenticated upstream user | gateway.auth.trustedProxy.allowUsers | no |
gateway.trusted_proxy_allow_loopback | warn | Trusted-proxy auth accepts explicitly allowed loopback proxy sources | gateway.auth.trustedProxy.allowLoopback | no |
gateway.probe_auth_secretref_unavailable | warn | Deep probe could not resolve auth SecretRefs in this command path | deep-probe auth source / SecretRef availability | no |
gateway.probe_failed | warn | Live Gateway probe failed (--deep only) | gateway reachability/auth | no |
discovery.mdns_full_mode | warn/critical | mDNS full mode advertises cliPath/sshPort metadata on local network | discovery.mdns.mode, gateway.bind | no |
config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags | warn | One insecure/dangerous debug flag is enabled | key named in finding detail | no |
security.audit.suppressions.active | info | Audit output has configured suppressions and may be filtered | security.audit.suppressions | no |
config.secrets.gateway_password_in_config | warn | Gateway password is stored directly in config | gateway.auth.password | no |
config.secrets.hooks_token_in_config | warn | Hook bearer token is stored directly in config | hooks.token | no |
hooks.token_reuse_gateway_token | critical | Hook ingress token also unlocks Gateway auth | hooks.token, gateway.auth.token, gateway.auth.password | no |
hooks.token_too_short | warn | Easier brute force on hook ingress | hooks.token | no |
hooks.default_session_key_unset | warn | Hook agent runs fan out into generated per-request sessions | hooks.defaultSessionKey | no |
hooks.allowed_agent_ids_unrestricted | warn/critical | Authenticated hook callers may route to any configured agent | hooks.allowedAgentIds | no |
hooks.request_session_key_enabled | warn/critical | External caller can choose sessionKey | hooks.allowRequestSessionKey | no |
hooks.request_session_key_prefixes_missing | warn/critical | No bound on external session key shapes | hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes | no |
hooks.path_root | critical | Hook path is /, making ingress easier to collide or misroute | hooks.path | no |
hooks.installs_unpinned_npm_specs | warn | Hook install records are not pinned to immutable npm specs | hook install metadata | no |
hooks.installs_missing_integrity | warn | Hook install records lack integrity metadata | hook install metadata | no |
hooks.installs_version_drift | warn | Hook install records drift from installed packages | hook install metadata | no |
logging.redact_off | warn | Sensitive values leak to logs/status | logging.redactSensitive | yes |
browser.control_invalid_config | warn | Browser control config is invalid before runtime | browser.* | no |
browser.control_no_auth | critical | Browser control exposed without token/password auth | gateway.auth.* | no |
browser.remote_cdp_http | warn | Remote CDP over plain HTTP lacks transport encryption | browser profile cdpUrl | no |
browser.remote_cdp_private_host | warn | Remote CDP targets a private/internal host | browser profile cdpUrl, browser.ssrfPolicy.* | no |
sandbox.docker_config_mode_off | warn | Sandbox Docker config present but inactive | agents.*.sandbox.mode | no |
sandbox.bind_mount_non_absolute | warn | Relative bind mounts can resolve unpredictably | agents.*.sandbox.docker.binds[] | no |
sandbox.dangerous_bind_mount | critical | Sandbox bind mount targets blocked system, credential, or Docker socket paths | agents.*.sandbox.docker.binds[] | no |
sandbox.dangerous_network_mode | critical | Sandbox Docker network uses host or container:* namespace-join mode | agents.*.sandbox.docker.network | no |
sandbox.dangerous_seccomp_profile | critical | Sandbox seccomp profile weakens container isolation | agents.*.sandbox.docker.securityOpt | no |
sandbox.dangerous_apparmor_profile | critical | Sandbox AppArmor profile weakens container isolation | agents.*.sandbox.docker.securityOpt | no |
sandbox.browser_cdp_bridge_unrestricted | warn | Sandbox browser bridge is exposed without source-range restriction | sandbox.browser.cdpSourceRange | no |
sandbox.browser_container.non_loopback_publish | critical | Existing browser container publishes CDP on non-loopback interfaces | browser sandbox container publish config | no |
sandbox.browser_container.hash_label_missing | warn | Existing browser container predates current config-hash labels | openclaw sandbox recreate --browser --all | no |
sandbox.browser_container.hash_epoch_stale | warn | Existing browser container predates current browser config epoch | openclaw sandbox recreate --browser --all | no |
sandbox.browser_container.docker_probe_timeout | warn | Docker label probe for the browser container timed out | Docker daemon reachability | no |
tools.exec.host_sandbox_no_sandbox_defaults | warn | exec host=sandbox fails closed when sandbox is off | tools.exec.host, agents.defaults.sandbox.mode | no |
tools.exec.host_sandbox_no_sandbox_agents | warn | Per-agent exec host=sandbox fails closed when sandbox is off | agents.list[].tools.exec.host, agents.list[].sandbox.mode | no |
tools.exec.security_full_configured | warn/critical | Host exec is running with security="full" | tools.exec.security, agents.list[].tools.exec.security | no |
tools.exec.agent_skill_mcp_boundary_drift | warn | Agent skill allowlists are present while host exec can reach MCP clients/registries | agents.list[].tools.exec.*, sandbox/OS isolation, MCP server credentials | no |
tools.exec.fs_tools_disabled_but_exec_enabled | warn | Filesystem tool policy does not make shell execution read-only | tools.deny, agents.list[].tools.deny, agents.*.sandbox.workspaceAccess | no |
tools.exec.auto_allow_skills_enabled | warn | Exec approvals trust skill bins implicitly | host approvals file | no |
tools.exec.allowlist_interpreter_without_strict_inline_eval | warn | Interpreter allowlists permit inline eval without forced reapproval | tools.exec.strictInlineEval, agents.list[].tools.exec.strictInlineEval, exec approvals allowlist | no |
tools.exec.safe_bins_interpreter_unprofiled | warn | Interpreter/runtime bins in safeBins without explicit profiles broaden exec risk | tools.exec.safeBins, tools.exec.safeBinProfiles, agents.list[].tools.exec.* | no |
tools.exec.safe_bins_broad_behavior | warn | Broad-behavior tools in safeBins weaken the low-risk stdin-filter trust model | tools.exec.safeBins, agents.list[].tools.exec.safeBins | no |
tools.exec.safe_bin_trusted_dirs_risky | warn | safeBinTrustedDirs includes mutable or risky directories | tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs, agents.list[].tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs | no |
tools.elevated.allowFrom.<provider>.wildcard | critical | tools.elevated.allowFrom.<provider> includes "*", approving every sender | tools.elevated.allowFrom.<provider> | no |
tools.elevated.allowFrom.<provider>.large | warn | Elevated allowlist for <provider> has more than 25 entries | tools.elevated.allowFrom.<provider> | no |
agents.claude_cli.permission_mode_overridden_by_yolo | warn | Claude CLI --permission-mode is ignored because OpenClaw exec is fully unattended | tools.exec.security, tools.exec.ask, cliBackends.claude-cli args | no |
skills.workspace.symlink_escape | warn | Workspace skills/**/SKILL.md resolves outside workspace root (symlink-chain drift) | workspace skills/** filesystem state | no |
skills.workspace.scan_truncated | warn | Workspace skill scan hit its directory-visit cap before finishing | flatten/simplify the workspace skills/ directory tree | no |
plugins.extensions_no_allowlist | warn | Plugins are installed without an explicit plugin allowlist | plugins.allowlist | no |
plugins.allow_phantom_entries | warn | plugins.allow lists an ID with no matching installed plugin | plugins.allow | no |
plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs | warn | Plugin index records are not pinned to immutable npm specs | plugin install metadata | no |
plugins.installs_missing_integrity | warn | Plugin index records lack integrity metadata | plugin install metadata | no |
plugins.installs_version_drift | warn | Plugin index records drift from installed packages | plugin install metadata | no |
plugins.code_safety | warn/critical | Plugin code scan found suspicious or dangerous patterns (--deep only) | plugin code / install source | no |
plugins.code_safety.entry_path | warn | Plugin entry path points into hidden or node_modules locations | plugin manifest entry | no |
plugins.code_safety.entry_escape | critical | Plugin entry escapes the plugin directory | plugin manifest entry | no |
plugins.code_safety.manifest_parse_error | warn | Plugin manifest could not be parsed during the code-safety scan | plugin manifest file | no |
plugins.code_safety.scan_failed | warn | Plugin code scan could not complete (--deep only) | plugin path / scan environment | no |
plugins.<pluginId>.security_audit_failed | warn | A plugin-owned security audit collector threw an error | that plugin’s security-audit collector | no |
skills.code_safety | warn/critical | Skill installer metadata/code contains suspicious or dangerous patterns (--deep only) | skill install source | no |
skills.code_safety.scan_failed | warn | Skill code scan could not complete (--deep only) | skill scan environment | no |
security.exposure.open_channels_with_exec | warn/critical | Shared/public rooms can reach exec-enabled agents | channels.*.dmPolicy, channels.*.groupPolicy, tools.exec.*, agents.list[].tools.exec.* | no |
security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated | critical | Open DMs/groups + elevated tools create high-impact prompt-injection paths | top-level or nested DM policy paths, account overrides, channels.*.groupPolicy | no |
security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs | critical/warn | Open DMs/groups can reach command/file tools without sandbox/workspace guards | DM/group policy paths, tools.profile/deny, tools.fs.workspaceOnly, agents.*.sandbox.mode | no |
security.exposure.open_groups_with_control_plane_tools | critical | Open DMs/groups can reach gateway/cron control-plane tools | DM/group policy paths, tools.allow, tools.alsoAllow, tools.profile, gateway, cron | no |
security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic | warn | Config looks multi-user while gateway trust model is personal-assistant | split trust boundaries, or shared-user hardening (sandbox.mode, tool deny/workspace scoping) | no |
tools.profile_minimal_overridden | warn | Agent overrides bypass global minimal profile | agents.list[].tools.profile | no |
plugins.tools_reachable_permissive_policy | warn | Extension tools reachable in permissive contexts | tools.profile + tool allow/deny | no |
models.legacy | warn | Legacy model families are still configured | model selection | no |
models.weak_tier | warn | Configured models are below current recommended tiers | model selection | no |
models.small_params | critical/info | Small models + unsafe tool surfaces raise injection risk | model choice + sandbox/tool policy | no |
channels.<provider>.dm.open | critical | <provider> DM policy is "open"; anyone can DM the bot | channels.<provider>.dmPolicy, .allowFrom | no |
channels.<provider>.dm.open_invalid | warn | dmPolicy="open" without "*" in allowFrom is inconsistent | channels.<provider>.allowFrom | no |
channels.<provider>.dm.scope_main_multiuser | warn | Multiple DM senders currently share the main session | session.dmScope | no |
channels.<provider>.allowFrom.dangerous_name_matching_enabled | info | dangerouslyAllowNameMatching re-enables mutable name/email/tag sender matching | disable dangerouslyAllowNameMatching, use stable sender IDs | no |
channels.<provider>.account.read_only_resolution | warn | A channel account could not be fully resolved for audit (missing secret/gateway) | ensure referenced secrets are resolvable, or run against a live gateway snapshot | no |
channels.<provider>.warning.<n> | info/warn/critical | Provider-specific security warning, classified from free-form plugin text | see finding detail | no |
summary.attack_surface | info | Roll-up summary of auth, channel, tool, and exposure posture | multiple keys (see finding detail) | no |
