Multi-agent sandbox and tools

Each agent in a multi-agent setup can override the global sandbox and tool policy. This page covers per-agent configuration, precedence rules, and examples.

Sandboxing

Backends and modes — full sandbox reference.

Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated

Debug “why is this blocked?”

Elevated mode

Elevated exec for trusted senders.

Auth is scoped by agent: each agent has its own agentDir auth store in ~/.openclaw/agents/<agentId>/agent/openclaw-agent.sqlite. Never reuse agentDir across agents. Agents can read through to the default/main agent’s auth profiles when they do not have a local profile, but OAuth refresh tokens are not cloned into secondary agent stores. If you copy credentials manually, copy only portable static api_key or token profiles.

---

Configuration examples

Example 1: Personal + restricted family agent

{
  "agents": {
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "main",
        "default": true,
        "name": "Personal Assistant",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
        "sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
      },
      {
        "id": "family",
        "name": "Family Bot",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-family",
        "sandbox": {
          "mode": "all",
          "scope": "agent"
        },
        "tools": {
          "allow": ["read", "message"],
          "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process", "browser"],
          "message": {
            "crossContext": {
              "allowWithinProvider": false,
              "allowAcrossProviders": false
            }
          }
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "bindings": [
    {
      "agentId": "family",
      "match": {
        "provider": "whatsapp",
        "accountId": "*",
        "peer": {
          "kind": "group",
          "id": "[e-mail]"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

Result:

• main agent: runs on host, full tool access.
• family agent: runs in Docker (one container per agent), only read and current-conversation message sends.

Example 2: Work agent with shared sandbox

{
  "agents": {
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "personal",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-personal",
        "sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
      },
      {
        "id": "work",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-work",
        "sandbox": {
          "mode": "all",
          "scope": "shared",
          "workspaceRoot": "/tmp/work-sandboxes"
        },
        "tools": {
          "allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"],
          "deny": ["browser", "gateway", "discord"]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

Example 2b: Global coding profile + messaging-only agent

{
  "tools": { "profile": "coding" },
  "agents": {
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "support",
        "tools": { "profile": "messaging", "allow": ["slack"] }
      }
    ]
  }
}

Result:

• default agents get coding tools.
• support agent is messaging-only (+ Slack tool).

Example 3: Different sandbox modes per agent

{
  "agents": {
    "defaults": {
      "sandbox": {
        "mode": "non-main",
        "scope": "session"
      }
    },
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "main",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
        "sandbox": {
          "mode": "off"
        }
      },
      {
        "id": "public",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-public",
        "sandbox": {
          "mode": "all",
          "scope": "agent"
        },
        "tools": {
          "allow": ["read"],
          "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch"]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

---

Configuration precedence

When both global (agents.defaults.*) and agent-specific (agents.list[].*) configs exist:

Sandbox config

Agent-specific settings override global:

agents.list[].sandbox.mode > agents.defaults.sandbox.mode
agents.list[].sandbox.scope > agents.defaults.sandbox.scope
agents.list[].sandbox.workspaceRoot > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceRoot
agents.list[].sandbox.workspaceAccess > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess
agents.list[].sandbox.docker.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.*
agents.list[].sandbox.browser.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.*
agents.list[].sandbox.prune.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.prune.*

agents.list[].sandbox.{docker,browser,prune}.* overrides agents.defaults.sandbox.{docker,browser,prune}.* for that agent (ignored when sandbox scope resolves to "shared").

Tool restrictions

The filtering order is:

1. Tool profile

   tools.profile or agents.list[].tools.profile.

2. Provider tool profile

   tools.byProvider[provider].profile or agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].profile.

3. Global tool policy

   tools.allow / tools.deny.

4. Provider tool policy

   tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny.

5. Agent-specific tool policy

   agents.list[].tools.allow/deny.

6. Agent provider policy

   agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny.

7. Sandbox tool policy

   tools.sandbox.tools or agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools.

8. Subagent tool policy

   tools.subagents.tools, if applicable.

Precedence rules

• Each level can further restrict tools, but cannot grant back denied tools from earlier levels.
• If agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools is set, it replaces tools.sandbox.tools for that agent.
• If agents.list[].tools.profile is set, it overrides tools.profile for that agent.
• Provider tool keys accept either provider (e.g. google-antigravity) or provider/model (e.g. openai/gpt-5.4).

Empty allowlist behavior

If any explicit allowlist in that chain leaves the run with no callable tools, OpenClaw stops before submitting the prompt to the model. This is intentional: an agent configured with a missing tool such as agents.list[].tools.allow: ["query_db"] should fail loudly until the plugin that registers query_db is enabled, not continue as a text-only agent.

Tool policies support group:* shorthands that expand to multiple tools. See Tool groups for the full list.

Per-agent elevated overrides (agents.list[].tools.elevated) can further restrict elevated exec for specific agents. See Elevated mode for details.

---

Migration from single agent

Before (single agent)

{
  "agents": {
    "defaults": {
      "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
      "sandbox": {
        "mode": "non-main"
      }
    }
  },
  "tools": {
    "sandbox": {
      "tools": {
        "allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"],
        "deny": []
      }
    }
  }
}

After (multi-agent)

{
  "agents": {
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "main",
        "default": true,
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
        "sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
      }
    ]
  }
}

Legacy agents.defaults.*/agents.list[].* config keys (such as sandbox.perSession, agentRuntime, embeddedPi) are migrated by openclaw doctor; prefer agents.defaults + agents.list going forward.

---

Tool restriction examples

Read-only agent

{
  "tools": {
    "allow": ["read"],
    "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process"]
  }
}

Shell execution with filesystem tools disabled

{
  "tools": {
    "allow": ["read", "exec", "process"],
    "deny": ["write", "edit", "apply_patch", "browser", "gateway"]
  }
}

This policy disables OpenClaw filesystem tools, but exec is still a shell and can write files wherever the selected host or sandbox filesystem allows. For a read-only agent, deny exec and process, or combine shell access with sandbox filesystem controls such as agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess: "ro" or "none".

Communication-only

{
  "tools": {
    "sessions": { "visibility": "tree" },
    "allow": ["sessions_list", "sessions_send", "sessions_history", "session_status"],
    "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "read", "browser"]
  }
}

sessions_history in this profile still returns a bounded, sanitized recall view rather than a raw transcript dump. Assistant recall strips thinking tags, <relevant-memories> scaffolding, plain-text tool-call XML payloads (including <tool_call>...</tool_call>, <function_call>...</function_call>, <tool_calls>...</tool_calls>, <function_calls>...</function_calls>, and truncated tool-call blocks), downgraded tool-call scaffolding, leaked ASCII/full-width model control tokens, and malformed MiniMax tool-call XML before redaction/truncation.

---

Common pitfall: “non-main”

agents.defaults.sandbox.mode: "non-main" checks the session key against the main session key (always "main"; session.mainKey is not user-configurable, and OpenClaw warns and ignores any other value), not the agent id. Group/channel sessions always get their own keys, so they are treated as non-main and will be sandboxed. If you want an agent to never sandbox, set agents.list[].sandbox.mode: "off".

---

Testing

After configuring multi-agent sandbox and tools:

1. Check agent resolution

   openclaw agents list --bindings
   
2. Verify sandbox containers

   docker ps --filter "name=openclaw-sbx-"
   
3. Test tool restrictions

   • Send a message requiring restricted tools.
   • Verify the agent cannot use denied tools.
4. Monitor logs

   openclaw logs --follow | grep -E "routing|sandbox|tools"
   

---

Troubleshooting

Agent not sandboxed despite `mode: 'all'`

• Check if there’s a global agents.defaults.sandbox.mode that overrides it.
• Agent-specific config takes precedence, so set agents.list[].sandbox.mode: "all".

Tools still available despite deny list

• Check the full filtering order: profile → provider profile → global policy → provider policy → agent policy → agent provider policy → sandbox → subagent.
• Each level can only further restrict, not grant back.
• See Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated for step-by-step debugging.

Container not isolated per agent

• Default scope is "agent" (one container per agent id).
• Set scope: "session" for one container per session, or scope: "shared" to reuse one container across agents.

---

Related

• Elevated mode
• Multi-agent routing
• Sandbox configuration
• Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated — debugging “why is this blocked?”
• Sandboxing — full sandbox reference (modes, scopes, backends, images)
• Session management